Working with Dan Schuman: A Remembrance by Champagne, Anthony
SMU Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 4 Article 3
2011
Working with Dan Schuman: A Remembrance
Anthony Champagne
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony Champagne, Working with Dan Schuman: A Remembrance, 64 SMU L. Rev. 1191 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol64/iss4/3
WORKING WITH DAN SHUMAN:
A REMEMBRANCE
Anthony Champagne*
T must have been in 1990 that I received a phone call from Dan Shu-
man, who introduced himself and said he would like to talk with me
about a research idea. I had not known Dan and still do not know
what prompted his call to me, but we met shortly thereafter. Dan ex-
plained to me that he thought there was a need for empirical research on
the use and possible abuse of expert witnesses. He said that, within the
legal community, there was much anecdote and speculation about how
expert witnesses were used, but there was a paucity of research on how
they were actually used. He asked if I would like to work with him on a
research paper that explored how experts were actually used.
I agreed, and that began a long friendship and a multi-year research
collaboration that resulted in a series of articles on expert witnesses' and
an article exploring both juror behavior and judicial selection. 2 The part
of the article on juries and judicial selection may have been our most
controversial since it used a review of empirical research to challenge
commonplace assumptions that merit selection of judges depoliticized the
selection of judges and that judges selected through merit selection were
better quality judges than were elected judges. In reference to our explo-
ration of the role of juries and judicial elections, we concluded:
Whatever the reason or reasons for elitist attacks on popular in-
volvement in the legal process, the interesting finding of social sci-
ence research is not only that "things are better off than I had
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feared ' 3 in reference to popular involvement in the process, but also
that elitist reforms do not create clear improvements in the process
and may even eliminate desirable consequences flowing from popu-
lar involvement .... The key point stressed by most social science
research on public forms of involvement in the litigation process-
whether it be popular selection of judges or juries-is that generally
speaking the people do a reasonable job in evaluating the informa-
tion available to them, whether it is trial testimony or judicial
candidates.4
It was what we said about judicial selection in the article that was most
controversial. Interestingly, what we wrote was long before the publica-
tion of a body of recent research which makes the same finding-that
every system of judicial selection is a highly political process and that
merit selection does not clearly result in higher quality judges over
elected judges, even though different judicial selection systems produce
different characteristics of judges. 5
The bulk of our work, however, focused on expert witnesses. We
quickly developed a routine for working together. Dan loved to meet at
a coffee shop roughly halfway between SMU and my university. I ini-
tially thought that location was chosen because it was a convenient loca-
tion for the two of us. I soon discovered, however, that Dan practically
used that coffee shop as an office. It was not unusual for him to have
several meetings scheduled with various collaborators, students, and
alumni all morning long. In those coffee shop meetings, Dan would
sketch out how he saw the research developing, and I would write the
initial draft. At the beginning of our research collaboration, I wondered
how far afield from his ideas I could go without irritating him, but he gave
me wide latitude. Dan would take the draft, add and subtract items, and
polish the article. Dan proved to be easy to work with, unlike some other
co-authors I have had. At an early point in our research, Dan believed
that we needed a litigator to help us understand how experts were used in
trial. He told me that he had the perfect litigator, a former student who
was very bright and could help us understand how litigators actually used
experts. That was when Elizabeth (Betsy) Whitaker was brought into the
research project. 6
At another point, Dan thought that a comparison of court-appointed
and privately retained experts would add to our research. I wondered
3. The quotation is, of course, from JIMMY BUFFET, CHANGES IN LATITUDES,
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES (ABC Records 1977). It should come as no surprise that this was
put in the article by Dan.
4. Shuman & Champagne, supra note 2, at 258.
5. Probably the most important of these recent studies are: CHRIS W. BONNEAU &
MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009) and Stephen J. Choi,
G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical
Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010).
6. Betsy's election as President of the State Bar in 2003-2004 was probably not due
to this research collaboration, though Dan and I would have gladly taken credit for her
election.
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how we could possibly get access to enough judges, lawyers, and experts
for such a study. It turned out that we had no problem. I quickly learned
that Dan had an enormous network of friends, colleagues, and former
students. If there was an issue that needed exploring or a question that
needed an answer, Dan knew someone who could help. We spoke with
numerous family lawyers, expert witnesses, and family court judges and
explored the use of court-appointed versus privately retained experts in
child custody cases. Interestingly, although the family lawyers often com-
plained about court-appointed experts, the judges and the experts were
quite favorable about court appointment versus private retention. 7
While we were researching the use of expert witnesses, Peter Huber
published Galileo's Revenge. Dan was very excited about the book which
was a study of "junk science" in the courts. The book provided numerous
examples of how science was misused in the courtroom and how judges
were misled by this bad science. Huber argued that "junk science" led to
wildly inappropriate damage awards.8 Dan thought our research would
provide a better sense of science in the courtroom-the more mainstream
reliance on expert testimony rather than the selective cases used in Hu-
ber's book. In mainstream lawsuits, Dan thought it was important to
know whether the "junk science" discussed by Huber was pervasive. Or,
to put it another way: were experts commonly misused in court?
In a series of articles published in Jurimetrics,9 we explored this ques-
tion. Our initial study surveyed expert witnesses, lawyers employing ex-
perts, judges hearing cases involving the experts, and jurors in civil cases
who heard the expert testimony. The study was limited to Dallas County.
However, we had some interesting findings in our preliminary study.
While experts testified in a majority of the civil cases we examined, most
of the cases involved experts on only one side which, of course, cast doubt
on the belief that trials are battles of experts. Nor did we find a group of
professional experts who were provided by expert referral firms and who
commanded large fees. Most of the experts were not professional wit-
nesses, and though many experts did testify frequently, they were not part
of an individual lawyer or a firm's stable of experts. While lawyers
tended to be unhappy with the fees the experts commanded, their pay
was actually consistent with their incomes as non-witnesses. The experts
proved not heavily dependent on a lawyer for their financial support.
Most interestingly, we found a conflict between the adversarial system
and the scientific method. Lawyers wanted experts who had integrity, but
they also wanted experts who were not tentative. Comparison shopping
for experts by lawyers was occurring, and lawyers did frequently coach
experts to present their findings in the most favorable light. We found
that "[m]any lawyers seem to want what is often impossible for experts to
7. Champagne, Easterling, Shuman, Tomkins, & Whitaker, supra note 1.
8. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1993).
9. See JURIMETRICS articles, supra note 1.
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give: they want personable, attractive experts who have integrity, are ar-
ticulate, have strong credentials, are willing to be coached, and draw firm
conclusions that support the lawyer's position."'10
The Dallas study was expanded in a survey of judges, lawyers, and ex-
perts in Baltimore, Seattle, and Tucson. In many ways our findings paral-
leled those of the Dallas County study. Again, we found support for the
criticism that the legal system asked conflicting roles of experts where
they were both expected to play the role of impartial scientist and to pro-
vide favorable testimony for the side that retained them. However, while
experts were chosen and used as advocates by the retaining lawyers, the
world of experts was not dominated by a group of highly paid profes-
sional experts who offered their services to the highest bidder. And, con-
trary to popular myths about the retention of expert witnesses, we found
little use of advertisements by experts in marketing their services, little
evidence of fees charged by experts that were disproportionate to the
income of the expert's occupation, and few experts who were professional
experts in the sense that they earned most of their incomes from
testifying.11
Working with SMU law students and University of Texas at Dallas
graduate students, our third empirical study surveyed former jurors in
Dallas County civil cases. While the popular image is of naYve jurors who
are influenced by superficial considerations or are deferential to experts
from high-status occupations, we found instead a "portrait of a thoughtful
juror who seeks to reach rational, case-specific decisions about ex-
perts." 12 In particular, we found that jurors evaluated experts on the ba-
sis of their qualifications, their familiarity with the case, their quality of
reasoning, and whether they were impartial in their testimony. 13
At the same time as our third empirical study, we surveyed the litera-
ture on juror assessments of the believability of expert witnesses. We
found the literature on this subject to be very limited. That literature
review, however, found several important points about what caused ju-
rors to believe experts. First, there was considerable juror suspicion of
expert testimony. Jurors were quick to disregard experts they perceived
as "hired guns." Jurors were most likely to believe experts that had done
some independent research on the subject and were not limited in their
conclusions to the information provided by the retaining lawyer. Of spe-
cial importance were communications skills. Jurors wanted experts who
could convey technical and complex information in a nontechnical and
understandable way. Indeed, communication skills and clarity of presen-
tation proved among the top characteristics of experts that made them
believable to jurors. 14
10. Part 1, supra note 1, at 375, 391-92.
11. Part 2, supra note 1, at 193, 206.
12. Part 3, supra note 1, at 23, 30.
13. Id. at 26.
14. Literature Review, supra note 1, at 371, 380-82.
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As Dan's illness worsened, he asked Betsy Whitaker and me to join
him for dinner. When we asked how he was doing, Dan told us that, if he
had a choice, he would want to die in his eighties in a plane crash as he
was returning from Europe, but he wasn't given that choice. He was still
full of ideas, and some months after that dinner, he told me that he had a
research idea that he was exploring and would like to work with me if a
grant came through. His illness did not defeat him. Dan continued his
work and his interest in looking at the law from an empirical perspective.
For Dan, it was not enough to know what the casebooks said or what
statutes said; he wanted to learn how the law really did work.
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